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I.
The theory of conditionals I propose, summarily stated, is the following. The 
meaning of eveiy uttered- conditional comprises a propositional basis which 
grounds the conditioning-relation expressed by the conditional in the utterance. 
If the conditional is uttered in different contexts, the propositional basis for a 
syntactically identical conditional may be different, and hence also the (pro- 
positional) meaning of the uttered conditional (and consequently its truth­
value). For conditionals that differ syntactically, the propositional basis may 
even be different in the same context of utterance (even if the utterance is by 
the same speaker). Given the propositional basis for a conditional uttered in a 
certain context, its meaning (as uttered) can be completely analyzed by using, 
besides its antecedent and its succedent, merely the operator of analytical 
necessity (which is the object-language representation of its concept of analyt­
ical truth), material implication and a sentence expressing the propositional 
basis concerned. This analysis can be stated in the modal object-language it­
self, without any need of going beyond it (to possible worlds and a relation of 
similarity between them—entities which are invoked in the standard semantics 
of Stalnaker and Lewis). For this reason the proposed theory o f conditionals is 
ontologically minimal. (Note that in it there is no object-language quantifi­
cation over propositions either.) And it is very simple: according to it, the logic 
of conditionals simply is a definitional extension of modal S5-logic. This result 
may seem to be highly implausible in view of the various peculiarities that dis­
tinguish conditionals both from strict and material implications. But the pecu­
liarities can be completely accounted for by shifts in the propositional bases of 
utterances of conditionals. The demonstration of this will fill by far the largest 
part of the paper; naturally, the explanation of the logically erratic behavior of 
conditionals makes or breaks any theory of conditionals.
The proposed theory, call it “bases-theory”, has a certain similarity to the 
so-called metalinguistic theory of conditionals which originally is due to 
Nelson Goodman; Frank Jackson presents the central tenet of that theory in his 
introduction to [1991] on p. 5:
“if A, then B” is true iff there is a statement S, meeting condition fi, 
such that “A&S” logically entails B.
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But the dissimilarities of bases-theory and the metalinguistic theory of 
conditionals should already be clear, too. First of all, bases-theory is not 
metalinguistic in a non-trivial sense (it can of course be brought into a 
metalinguistic form; see below): in it, for stating the truth-conditions of 
conditionals, there is no need to quantify over object-language statements. 
Secondly, the metalinguistic theory of conditionals does not adequately 
represent the context-dependence of conditionals; for bases-theory the very 
same conditional (syntactically speaking) can be true on one occasion of 
utterance, and false on another, while the truth-values of A and B, and even the 
propositions expressed by them, stay the same. (Nor is this context-dependence 
adequately represented by the object-language counterpart of the metalinguistic 
theory: with quantifiers binding propositional variables; the meaning that 
bases-theory ascribes to conditionals cannot be adequately analyzed in this 
way.)
Bas van Fraassen says in [1985] on p. 29: “a counterfactual can be true, but 
only because some factual statement is true. Thus, consider ‘If I were to open 
my drawer, I should see a bottle of ink.’ This is true because there is a bottle of 
ink in the drawer (and because I have adequate eyesight, and so on). It would 
be quite difficult to give a general account of the factual conditions that make 
counterfactuals true or false.” Indeed, it would be quite difficult, because these 
factual conditions are very heterogeneous. Fortunately, there is no need, in 
presenting a theory of conditionals, to give a general account of them; we can 
simply take them as being expressed by sentences out of a certain class of 
statements, say, SI, S2, S3, ...; all these statements express conditions that 
could be presupposed in utterances of conditionals. Then the adequate 
metalinguistic statement of the basis-theory of conditionals (without quantifi­
cation over object-language statements) is:
“if A, n-then B” is true iff Sn is true and “A&Sn” logically [or better: 
analytically} entails B, or A alone logically entails B.
This is to be understood as giving the truth-condition of an utterance of “if 
A, then B” on an occasion in which Sn is taken to express the presupposed 
condition, (“logically entails” is to be broadly construed: in the sense of 
“analytically entails.” The tag “or A alone logically entails B” needs to be 
added; for sometimes, pace van Fraassen, the presupposed condition is of no 
importance for the truth of the uttered conditional, even if it is a counterfactual 
one.)
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2.
The formal apparatus necessary for a precise formulation o f the proposed 
theory o f conditionals is quickly stated. Let L be a language o f propositional 
logic (p, q, r, p ’, q ’, r’, ... are its propositional variables) whose basic operators 
are negation and material implication L is being enriched by the 
operator o f  analytical necessity (“N”) and by infinitely many basis-variables 
( b l ,  b2, b3, ...) which function syntactically just like propositional variables. 
Basis-variables are to be thought o f  as expressing possible bases for uttered 
conditionals.
The logic o f L is stated by the following axiom- and rule-schemata.
Al A -X B ^ A ).
A2 (A—>(B-»C))—>((A—>B)-»(A—>C)).
A3 (~A—>-B)—>(B—>A).
A4 N A —>A.
A5 N(A—>B)—>(NA—>NB).
A6 -N A —>N-NA.
RI A, A—>B |-B .
R2 A I-NA.
[“and”], “v ” [“or”], “P” [“possibly”] are defined in the usual way by 
and “N ” Binding strength decreases from left to right in the 
sequence: ~, &, v , —
3.
To this familiar logical system three definition-schemata are added.
DI (if A, n-then B) := bn&N(bn&A—>B)vN (A-^B).
D2 (if A had been, n-then B) := ~A&(if A, n-then B).
D3 (if A had been, n-then B would have been) := ~B& (if A, n-then B).
DI is appropriate for indicative conditionals. Every conditional that is 
neutral as to the truth-value o f  both its antecedent and its succedent is here 
considered to  be an indicative conditional. (Sometimes indicative conditionals 
in this sense are also formulated in the mode “if  A were, B would be”.) D2 is 
appropriate for semi-counterfactual conditionals: the definiens o f  D2 logically 
implies only the falsity o f  the antecedent, not also the falsity M  Iha niccedent.
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D3 is fitting for fully counterfactual conditionals’, the definiens of D3 logically 
implies both the falsity of the antecedent and the falsity of the succedent. 
(Sometimes fully counterfactual conditionals are also formulated in the mode 
“if A were, B would be”.)
As to the justification of DI: given an utterance of “if A, then B”, the 
conditional uttered can always be disambiguated according to the basis used 
for the utterance. If, for example, this basis is the proposition expressed by 
“b l”, the disambiguation of “if A, then B” is “if A, 1-then B.” But the latter, I 
claim, precisely amounts to “bl&N(bl&A—>B)vN (A—>B)”; this is what is 
meant, when it is said that the conditioning relation between the proposition 
expressed by A and the proposition expressed by B holds in virtue o f  the 
proposition expressed by “bl” (if there is any need at all of an external support 
for that relation; the eventuality that there is no need is taken care of by the 
clause “vN(A—>B)”).
4.
The following two important theorem-schemata are easily proved:
T1 (If A, n-then B)-»(A—>B).
T2 N(A-»B)->(if A, n-then B).
It is quite obvious that neither the converse of T 1 nor the converse of T2 
can be proved; in logical strength, “if,n-then” is between strict and material 
implication (for all n).
If we add to the axiom-schemata above “bn—>Nbn”, then the converse of 
T2 becomes provable; and if the converse of T2 is assumed as an axiom­
schema, we can prove “bn—>Nbn”: an instance of the converse of T2 is 
“(if-bn , n-then bn)—>N(~bn—>bn)”,and this, given DI, amounts to 
“bn—>Nbn”
If, however, we add “bn&(N(bn—>C)vN(bn—>~C))vNCvN~C” to the 
axiom-schemata above, then the converse of T1 becomes provable: assume 
A—>B; we have (1) bn&N(bn—>B) v bn&N(bn-»-B) v NB v N-B, and 
(2) bn&N(bn—>A) v bn&N(bn—>~A) v NA v N-A; let the four disjuncts of 
(1) be designated by (a), (b),(c), (d), those of (2) by (a'), (b ), (c'), (d'); given 
(a) or (c): if A, n-then B (by DI); given (b') or (d): if A, n-then B (by DI); 
given (d) and (c'): this contradicts the assumption; given (d) and (a'): this 
contradicts the assumption; given (b) and (c'): this contradicts the assumption; 
given (b) and (a'): this contradicts the assumption.
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Conversely, if  the converse of T1 is assumed as an axiom-schema, we can 
prove “bn&(N(bn—»C)vN (bn—»—C)) v NC v  N -C ”:
“(-C-»C) -»  bn&N(bn&-C-»C)vN (~C-»C) is an instance of that converse 
(expanded according to DI), and so is
“(C—>-C)—»bn&N(bn&C-»~C)vN (C-»~C); the rest is obvious. The principle 
just deduced from the converse of T1 is more concisely formulated as 
ltNnCvNn-C”; see D4 in section 5 below. O f course, neither “bn—»Nbn” nor 
“NnCvNn~C” is at all plausible as a general logical principle for all n; this is 
the measure of the implausibility that “if,then” coincides logically with material 
or strict implication.
We can, however, also prove the theorem schemata
T3(a) (If A, n-then B)&(if B, n-then C)—»(if A, n-then C), 
T3(b) (If A had been, n-then B would have been)&(if B had been, 
n-then C would have been)—»(if A had been, n-then C would have been),
and their corollaries (since “If A&D, n-then A” is trivially provable)
T4(a) (If A, n-then B)—»(if A&D, n-then B),
T4(b) (If A had been, n-then B would have been)—»(if A&D had been, 
n-then B would have been).
And these results seem to demonstrate the inadequacy of the proposed 
theory of conditionals. Apparently, there are obvious counter-examples to T3 
and T4 in ordinary language:
(1) “If the match is struck, it lights” is true, but “if the match is struck and 
wet, it lights” is not true.
I  answer: The two sentences must be analyzed with reference to a context 
of utterance in which the first is true and the second false— a context 
concerning normal matches. But then the propositional basis for the first 
conditional must differ from the propositional basis for the second conditional. 
Let the propositional basis (in the context of utterance) for the first conditional 
be expressed by “bl”. Clearly, since “if the match is struck, it lights” is true, 
“N(bl-» the match is not wet)” needs to be true also, or in other words, the 
propositional basis for the first conditional needs to comprise the proposition 
that the match is not wet, otherwise it could not support the truth o f the 
conditional. Since “N(bl-» the match is not wet)” is true, “if the match is 
struck and wet, the match lights” would have to be trivially true, if  “bl” also 
expressed the propositional basis for the latter conditional; for then this
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conditional (as meant in the context of utterance) would have to be 
disambiguated by “if the match is struck and wet, 1-then the match lights”, and 
according to DI this is trivially true, if “N (b l—> the match is not wet)” is true 
(given the truth of “b l ”, whose truth is implied, according to DI, in the 
assumption that the first conditional is true; there is no basis-free analytic 
connection between its antecedent and succedent). But on the contrary, “if the 
match is struck and wet, then it lights” is not true. Therefore, “b l ” does not 
express the basis for that conditional, and that basis is different from the basis 
for “if the match is struck, it lights.” Let the basis for “if the match is struck and 
wet, it lights” be expressed by “b2.” (Most likely that basis is the proposition 
expressed by “bl” minus the proposition that the match is not wet.) Then the 
two conditionals with the propositional meaning they have in the supposed 
context of utterance can be formalized like this: “if p, 1-then q”, “if p&r, 2-then 
q”; but “(if p, 1-then q)&not(if p&r, 2-then q)” is not a counter-example to 
T4(a).
(2) “If the match had been struck, it would have lighted” is true, but
“if the match had been struck and wet, it would have lighted” is not true.
I  answer. Changing the supposed counter-example from indicative to fully 
counterfactual conditionals does not improve it. Simply add to the above 
analysis for (1) the piece of information that “the match has not lighted” is true, 
and adjust what has to be adjusted; then the analysis also applies to (2), and (2) 
is seen not to be a counterexample to T4(b).
(3) “If J. Edgar Hoover were today a communist, then he would be a traitor” 
is true, and “if J. Edgar Hoover had been bom a Russian, then he would 
today be a communist” is also true; but “if J. Edgar Hoover had been 
bom a Russian, then he would be a traitor” is not true.
I  answer: This example, which is due to Robert Stalnaker (in [1968]; see 
[1991], p. 38), is somewhat outdated; but presumably there once was a context 
o f utterance which yielded precisely the offered distribution o f truth-values on 
the three conditionals. Now, clearly, in that context of utterance the three 
conditionals did not all have the same basis. Consider the bases used in it. The 
basis for the first conditional obviously contains the proposition that J. Edgar 
Hoover is (at the time concerned) an American citizen; the basis for the second 
conditional obviously contains the proposition that everybody who is bom a 
Russian cannot escape communist indoctrination which will make him a 
communist for life; the basis for the third conditional, however, does not
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contain the first proposition, or not the second (most likely not the first). Since 
the third basis differs from the first and second, (3) presents no counter­
example to T3(b).
Another theorem-schema that is easily proved is
T5 (If A, n-then-B)—»(if B, n-then-A).
There seem to be obvious counter-examples to T5 (representing all variants 
of contraposition), too:
(4) “If he has made a mistake, then it is not a big mistake” is true, but 
“if he has made a big mistake, then it is not a mistake” is not true.
(This one is due to Frank Jackson; see [1991], p. 3.)
I  answer Again there is no counter-example. But first of all, the two 
sentences, if they are to constitute a counter-example to T5 at all, need to be 
rephrased: “if he has made a mistake, then he has not made a big mistake”, “if 
he has made a big mistake, then he has not made a mistake.” Now, the basis for 
the first conditional in the supposed context o f utterance is different from the 
basis for the second (hence the correct formalization of (4) can only be, say, 
“(if p, 3-then ~q)&~(if q, 4-then -p )”, which obviously does not contradict 
T5). The obtaining basis for the first conditional contains the proposition 
that any mistake he has made (at the occasion concerned) is not a big mistake, 
or in other words, that he has not made a big mistake (at the occasion 
concerned). The basis for the second conditional, however, does not obtain, 
or does not contain that proposition. If it did contain it and obtained, 
the second conditional would turn out to be trivially true, contradicting 
what is assumed in (4): “if q, 4-then ~p” is according to DI short for 
“b4&N(b4&q-»~p)vN (q—>-p)” (“q” represents “he has made a big mistake”, 
“p" represents “he has made a mistake”); but this, since “b4” is supposed to be 
true, is trivially true, if “N(b4—>~q)” is true, what is precisely the case, if the 
basis for the second conditional contains the proposition that he has not made a 
big mistake.
5.
Whatever the basis for the second conditional is (we have assumed that it is 
expressed by “b4”), the conditional “if he has made a big mistake, n-then he 
has made a  mistake” -formalized: “if q, n-then p”—will turn out to be true not 
only for 4, but for any n; this is so simply in virtue of the truth of “N(q—>p) ”
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Suppose “if q, m-then ~p”—in contrast to “if q, 4-then ~p”—is indeed true (in 
the same context of utterance) besides “if q, m-then p.” Then, what kind of 
basis has to be expressed by “bm”? In general, we obtain from “if A, n-then B” 
and “if A, n-then ~B”: “bn&N(bn—>~A)vN -A ”. Hence, since “~N~q” is 
certainly true, we obtain the result that “bm&N(bm—>~q)” needs to be true 
(given the above supposition); that is, “bm” must express an obtaining basis 
that is incompatible with the proposition that he (the person concerned) has 
made a big mistake. One such basis is the basis expressed by “b3”.
I add the following definitions:
D4 NnA := bn&N(bn—>A)vN A. 
D5 PnA := ~Nn~A.
From the preceding paragraph we can then gather that the following 
theorem is provable:
T6 PnA —> ((if A, n-then B) —» -(if A, n-then ~B)).
This corresponds to Stalnaker’s axiom (a4) (in [1968]). It is moreover 
obvious from D1 and D4 that we can also prove
T7 (if A, n-then B )^N n(A ^B ).
This, from the right to the left, corresponds to Stalnaker’s axiom (a3). From 
the left to the right, it is not obtainable in Stalnaker’s system. (According to 
Stalnaker [see [1991], p. 37f.], the conditional connective cannot be analyzed 
as a modal [necessitation] operation performed on a material conditional, the 
reasons being the apparent counter-examples (1) - (4); one more problem case 
is discussed below in section 10.) But the principle corresponding to the 
weaker theorem “Nn(if A, n-thenB) -4 Nn(A—>B)" is easily proven in 
Stalnaker’s system from (a6), which corresponds to T1 above, and (a2), which 
corresponds to the also provable
T8 Nn(A—>B)—>(NnA—>NnB).
In the proof of the principle corresponding to
“Nn(if A, n-then B)—>Nn(A—>B)”, besides modus ponens, Stalnaker’s rule of 
necessitation is used, which is here represented by the provable rule-schema
T9 A |-NnA.
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We can also prove the theorems which correspond to Stalnaker’s 
definitions of necessity and possibility :
T10(a) NnA o  (if -A , n-then A), 
T 10(b) P n A w ~ (ifA , n-then -A).
6.
The principle corresponding to Stalnaker’s controversial axiom (a5) is not 
provable in our system. Nor should it be; there are very clear counter-examples 
to the conditional distribution principle “(If A, n-then BvC) —> (if A, n-then 
B)v(if A, n-then C))”, which, since it is valid for material implication, is 
actually one of the less known paradoxes of material implication. Consider a 
container filled with fifty white and fifty black balls (and no other balls) of the 
very same size and weight which are being constantly mixed. Let “b5” express 
the (hypothetical) fact just described (and some other facts: concerning colour­
constancy, and so on). Then the conditional “if George draws a ball from the 
container, 5-then he draws a white ball or a black one” is true; but neither the 
conditional “if George draws a ball from the container, 5-then he draws a white 
ball” is true, nor the corresponding conditional ending with “a black ball.” The 
basis for these conditionals, the (hypothetically true) proposition expressed by 
"b5”, is only sufficient for the truth of the first conditional, but not for the truth 
of the second or the third. This situation does not change at all, if we consider 
counterfactual conditionals instead of indicative conditionals. Suppose George, 
in fact, never draws a ball from the container. “If George had drawn a ball from 
the container, 5-then he would have drawn a white ball or a black one” is true 
(according to the definitions given); but neither “if George had drawn a ball 
from the container, 5-then he would have drawn a white ball” is true, nor “if 
George had drawn a ball from the container, 5-then he would have drawn a 
black ball.” (This counter-example can easily be adapted to providing also a 
counter-example to the principle o f  conditional excluded middle, “(If A, n-then 
B)v(if A, n-then ~B)”, which is an obvious logical consequence o f the 
conditional distribution principle.)
7.
Stalnaker’s last axiom (a7) corresponds to
T i l  (If A, n-then B)&(ifB,n-then A ) -> ((if A, n-then C)—>(if B, n-thenC)).
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The proof of this, given T3(a), is immediate (Since (al) in Stalnaker’s 
system merely captures the tautologies of propositional logic, (a5) is the only 
Stalnaker-principle not acceptable for the bases-theory of conditionals.) 
Stalnaker’s (a7) is obviously intended to be the (weaker) substitute for the 
transitivity principle (here represented by T3). But if the apparent counter­
examples to the transitivity principle are considered to be convincing (they are 
not), then it is not very difficult to produce counter-examples of the same ilk to 
(a7) as well:
(5) “If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, somebody else shot Kennedy” is true;
“if somebody else shot Kennedy, Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy” is also 
true, and so is “if Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, he was not [at the time of 
the shooting] in the place from where Kennedy was shot”; but “if 
somebody else shot Kennedy, Oswald was not in the place [at the time of 
the shooting] from where Kennedy was shot” is not true.
In fact, (5) does not contradict T11; for the four conditionals do not all have 
the same basis (in the supposed context of utterance). The first three 
conditionals can be assigned a common basis, expressed by “b6”; this 
obtaining basis contains (analytically implies) the propositions that precisely 
one person shot Kennedy, and that everybody in the place [at the time of the 
shooting] from where Kennedy was shot shot Kennedy, hence that there was at 
most one person in the place [at the time of the shooting] from w here Kennedy 
was shot. (It can easily be checked that the first three conditionals turn out to 
be true according to DI, if “b6” is true). But if the fourth conditional is to be 
not true, the basis expressed by “b6” cannot be the basis for it; for if it were, 
the fourth conditional would be true, too. (Suppose somebody other than 
Oswald shot Kennedy; hence Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy [because precisely 
one person shot Kennedy]; hence Oswald [at the time of the shooting] was not 
in the place from where Kennedy was shot [because everybody in that place at 
the time of the shooting shot Kennedy].) On the contrary, the basis for the 
fourth conditional obviously does not preclude the possibility' that there was 
more than one person in the place from where Kennedy was shot [at the time of 
the shooting].
8.
How can the proposed theory of conditionals account for the fact (or the 
intuition of the majority of people) that (a) “if Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy [in 
Dallas, on that day in 1963], somebody else did” is true, while (b) “if Oswald
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had not shot Kennedy [in Dallas, on that day in 1963], somebody else would 
have” is false? The reason for this is not that fully counterfactual conditionals 
are essentially different from indicative conditionals, as so many suppose. The 
two sentences— in the given context of utterance in which the one is true, the 
other false—simply have different bases. The basis for (a) may be taken to be 
expressed by “b6”, although a much weaker basis would suffice for the truth of 
(a): a basis that consists merely in the proposition that somebody shot 
Kennedy. But the basis for (b) cannot also be expressed by “b6”; else (b) 
would turn out to be true (according to DI and D3, assuming that in fact 
nobody other than Oswald shot Kennedy). Rather, the basis for (b) (in the 
given context of utterance) quite obviously comprises the proposition that for 
some reason Kennedy was bound to be shot by somebody (as a matter of 
personal doom, historical necessity, or whatever); since most of us do not 
believe this (while believing that somebody shot Kennedy!), and since also, as 
every reasonable person knows, Kennedy’s being shot by somebody else is not 
analytically implied by his not being shot by Oswald, most of us judge (b) to be 
false (in accordance with DI and D3).
The relationship between indicative conditionals and fully counterfactual 
conditionals is the one codified by D3: if  the succedent of an indicative 
conditional is false, then the corresponding fully counterfactual conditional has 
the same truth-value as the indicative conditional, i f  there is the same basis fo r  
both conditionals. Let me illustrate this further. Suppose that George is looking 
for Jim; George wants to know from Jim how old Jim is. While looking for 
Jim, George learns that everybody in room 101 is older than thirty. On the 
basis of this fact, he truly asserts “if Jim is in room 101, he is older than thirty”, 
which assertion can be disambiguated by “if  Jim is in room 101, 7-then he is 
older than thirty”, “b7” expressing the proposition that everybody in room 101 
is older than thirty. But a'little bit later George discovers that Jim is younger 
than 25. In an appropriate sense, George can now assert truly “if Jim had been 
in room 101, he would have been older than thirty”, namely in the sense of “if 
Jim had been in room 101, 7-then he would have been older than thirty”.(This 
shows that not only lawlike statements can sustain a counterfactual 
conditional.) But of course there are other senses of “if Jim had been in room 
101, then he would have been older than thirty”—in other words, other 
possible bases for this sentence in the supposed context o f utterance— 
according to which it is false. Let “b8” express the proposition that necessarily 
(as determined by the laws of nature) everybody in room 101 is older than 
thirty; “b8” is (I presume) a false sentence, and this makes “if Jim had been in 
room 101,8-then he would have been older than thirty” false  (according to D I, 
D3); but it also makes the corresponding indicative conditional “if Jim is in
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room 101, 8-then Jim is older than thirty” false (according to DI). Or let “b9” 
express the proposition that at least 90% of the persons in room 101 are older 
than thirty. “b9” is a true sentence; nevertheless, “if Jim had been in room 101, 
9-then he would have been older than thirty” is false, since it is analytically 
possible that Jim is in room 101 and at least 90% of the persons in room 101 
are older than thirty, but Jim isn’t; and for the very same reason the 
corresponding indicative conditional “if Jim is in room 101, 9-then he is older 
than thirty” is also false.
9.
Consider what Stalnaker calls the “direct argument” (in [1975]; see[1991], p. 
136):
(6) Either the butler or the gardener did it. Therefore, if the butler didn’t do it, 
the gardener did.
The obvious validity of this inference is often taken to be very good 
evidence (especially in view of Tl) for the hypothesis that the truth-conditions 
for indicative conditionals are those for material implications. I will argue that 
this is not so.
For understanding an uttered conditional to the extent of being able to 
assign a truth-value to it, it is all important to determine the basis for it in the 
given context of utterance. In practice, we are very good at accurately infering 
that basis without one additional word spoken from the evidence presented by 
the context of utterance. But if we have difficulties in determining it, we can 
always ask, and sometimes, if we care enough, we actually do: “What are your 
reasons for this conditional judgment?” (Certainly, the person asserting the 
conditional, while being quite positive in its assertion, will not always be able 
to give a sufficiently precise answer to this question. This phenomenon is no 
point against the bases-theory of conditionals, but simply an example of 
semantic vagueness, which in other instances, too, is paired with positive 
assertion.) Indeed, sometimes, the speaker is even so kind as to state his or her 
reasons for asserting a conditional before even asserting the conditional itself. 
This, typically, is done, if it is feared that the truth of the conditional will be 
doubtful for the hearer; and, typically, it is done by stating an inference of the 
conditional (as conclusion) from a sentence expressing the intended basis for it 
(as premise). (6) is a fitting example. Let “biO” express the proposition that 
either the butler or the gardener did it. It is incomplete, and hence misleading, 
to formalize (6) as “pvq [-p—>q]; therefore: if ~p, then q”; its correct
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formalization is “pvq; therefore: if  -p, 10-then q.” Since “biO” is analytically 
equivalent to “either the butler or the gardener did it”, (6) is immediately seen 
to be a valid inference on the basis of DI (its premise cannot possibly be true 
without its conclusion being also true). But it is not valid in virtue of being an 
instance of a general rule of inference “AvB [~A—>B]; therefore: if ~A, [n- 
]then B” which would allow to deduce indicative conditionals from material 
implications. The proposed inference-schema is not correct; this can even be 
seen, if we stick to “p” (“the butler did it”) and “q” (“the gardener did it”); for 
we can find a possible context o f utterance in which the inference “pvp; 
therefore: if -p , then q” is not valid. In that context of utterance simply a 
stronger basis for “if ~p, then q” is used than is expressed by “pvq” (or by 
“biO”)— a basis that does not obtain in that context of utterance, thereby 
falsifying “if ~p, then q”, although “pvq” is true in it. Suppose the speaker in 
asserting “if the butler didn’t do it, the gardener did” grounds this—seriously 
believing in a literary stereotype—on the basis that the murderer is always (in 
murders involving as suspects a gardener and a butler) either the butler 
(concerned) or the gardener (concerned), and not merely on the fact that in the 
particular murder at hand the murderer is either the butler or the gardener.
10.
Material implications are sometimes used as bases for conditionals; this 
accounts for the illusion that indicative conditionals have the same truth 
conditions as material implications. Moreover, sometimes even the succedent 
of a conditional, or rather the proposition expressed by its succedent, is used as 
a basis for it (or a basis is used which analytically implies that proposition). 
This, by generating an apparent lack of logical connection between antecedent 
and succedent, creates the illusion that T7, read from the left to the right, is not 
a correct principle for conditionals. Consider:
(7) “If the earth is a cube, the moon is not a cube” is true; but “it is not 
impossible that both the earth and the moon are cubes” is true, too.
I  answer: Of course it is not analytically impossible that both the moon and 
the earth are cubes; but this does not give us a counter-example to T7 (from left 
to right). The basis for the conditional in the supposed context of utterance is 
quite obviously the proposition that the moon is not a cube. (Imagine the 
context o f utterance: Hobbes obstinately maintains that both the moon and the 
earth are cubes; Calvin, however, while being uncertain about the correct shape
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of the earth, is absolutely sure that the moon is not a cube. In exasperation he 
exclaims “If the earth is a cube, the moon is not a cube!”) Let this proposition 
be expressed by “bl 1”; then we have: “if the earth is a cube, 11-then the moon 
is not a cube” is true; but so is “Nil(the earth is a cube -> the moon is not a 
cube)”, and hence also “~Pll(the earth is a cube & the moon is a cube).” 
Therefore, (7) is either irrelevant for T7, or untenable.
11.
What is deviant about the conditional “if Jones lives in London, he lives in 
Scotland”? Nothing whatever, except that it would be rather difficult for us to 
say something true, if we uttered it. This tells against the truth-conditions of 
indicative conditionals being the truth-conditions of material implications; for 
if the former were the latter, our example-sentence (which is due to Frank 
Jackson; see [1991], p. 2) would, on the contrary, have a very good chance of 
turning out true on various occasions of utterance. Material implicationists 
reply that what is deviant about the sentence is not its unlikeliness of being true 
when uttered, but rather its very low assertability which, they say, is only to 
some degree determined by its chances of being true.
According to the theory of conditionals here proposed, a conditional is 
assertable in a context o f utterance, only if the speaker believes it to be true 
(only if the subjective probability of the conditional is 1 or almost 1); but there 
may be other requirements it must meet, too (see below in section 12). Being 
assertable in a context of utterance has to be distinguished from assertability 
simpliciter, only the latter can be high or low. Believing a conditional to be 
true, usually (but not always) involves believing that the basis for it in the given 
context of utterance is an obtaining proposition, something which is the case. 
Thus, the [absolute] assertability of a conditional is measured by the number of 
believable bases for it that make the conditional true, if they obtain. Every 
possible basis for the utterance of a conditional (whether it obtains or not) will 
“make” a conditional true whose antecedent analytically implies its succedent; 
hence such conditionals are assertable in the highest degree. But the 
assertability of “if Jones lives in London, he lives in Scotland” is indeed low, 
because there are not so many believable bases for it that make the conditional 
true, if they obtain. In fact, given a certain construal of “lives in”, they must be 
found among the obtaining bases that are analytically incompatible with the 
proposition expressed by its antecedent. Given the mentioned construal of 
“lives in”, “if Jones lives in London, he does not live in Scotland” is assertable 
in the highest degree, because its antecedent analytically implies its succedent, 
or in other words, because “N(Jones lives in London —> Jones does not live in
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Scotland)” is true on that construal. Hence, according to DI, “if Jones lives in 
London, n-then he does not live in Scotland” is true for every n. Hence, if the 
conditional “if  Jones lives in London, m-then he lives in Scotland” is to be 
made true by a believable basis m if it obtains, we must conclude, because of 
T6, that “-PmJones lives in London” is true for it; hence, by D4 and since 
“-NJones lives in London” is true: m is an obtaining basis that is analytically 
incompatible with Jones’ living in London.
More interesting believable bases that make the conditional true, if  they 
obtain, can only be had, if “lives in” is construed differently, more liberally: in 
such a manner that it is analytically possible for one and the same person to 
live in different places (as everybody construes it, if somebody says “I live in 
Sweden and in New Zealand”). But if “lives in” is construed in that manner, 
then but a little strain to the imagination will produce a believable basis that 
makes the conditional true, if it obtains, and that is not incompatible with the 
proposition expressed by its antecedent. Consider the proposition that Jones, a 
bigamist, is living precisely where his two wives live, that each wife is living at 
one place in Britain, that none of the wives knows that he has another wife, that 
Jones wants to keep it that way, that, therefore, he has put a distance between 
his two wives that is as long as it can be, given that both wives are living on the 
mainland of Britain and given that the woman he married first lives in the south 
of England. A private eye, determined to find out where Jones lives, might well 
come to believe this in the course o f his investigations, and on the basis o f this 
and some well known geographical facts, he might well say to his secretary “If 
Jones lives in London, then he lives in Scotland”—and this is true, if the basis 
is in fact the case. (The initial astonishment of the secretary at this enigmatic 
utterance will quickly disappear, if the detective cares to explain.)
Suppose now this situation is real, and the detective finds out that Jones is 
not living in Scotland. Then, holding on to the basis for his utterance o f the 
indicative conditional, he can assert the fully counterfactual conditional “If 
Jones lived [had lived] in London, then he would live [would have lived] in 
Scotland”, and this also is true, if the basis is in fact the case. Let’s assume that 
the basis in fact obtains. According to the Stalnaker-semantics for counter- 
factual conditionals, the truth of “if Jones lived in London, then he would live 
in Scotland” implies that die world most similar to the actual world which is a 
world in which Jones is living in London is a world in which he is also living in 
Scotland. According to the Lewis-semantics for counterfactual conditionals 
(restated in [1979]; see [1991], p. 56), its truth implies that some world in 
which Jones is living in London and in Scotland is more similar to the actual 
world than any world in which Jones is living in London and not in Scotland. 
Both similarity statements are prima facie highly implausible; they need
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explanation, and the explanation consists precisely in recounting the piece of 
information about the actual world that constitutes the basis for the detective’s 
utterance. Therefore, why not leave merely picturesque—and sometimes posi­
tively misleading—talk about possible worlds and their countless similarities, 
why not straightforwardly consider the propositional bases for the utterances of 
conditionals?
The same point can be made with reference to Kit Fine’s example “if Nixon 
had pressed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust.” According 
to Lewis, the truth of this—it is agreed on all hands that the conditional is 
true—implies that some world in which Nixon presses the button and there is 
[ensues] a nuclear holocaust is more similar to the actual world than any world 
in which Nixon presses the button and there is no nuclear holocaust. Again, this 
is prima facie highly implausible, and it can be made plausible only, if 
similarity is spelled out in terms of a propositional basis for the utterance of 
the conditional that consists mainly of laws of nature and certain contingent 
matters of fact, but not of propositions about the overall phenomenal 
appearance of the earth (compare [1991], p. 58ff, especially p. 64). That 
propositional basis is all that needs to be referred to in evaluating the 
conditional, and, of course, it need not be interpreted as being a set of possible 
worlds.
But to suit everyone’s taste and for reasons of better comparability with the 
rivalling approaches, here is the orthodox semantic statement of the truth­
condition for conditionals according to bases-theory:
V /if A, n-then B)=l iff: ie V(n,A,B) and V(n,A,B)n[A] c[B], or [A]c[B]; 
where i is a possible world out of a non-empty set I of possible worlds, n is the 
index out of a non-empty set of indices C that corresponds to n, V(n,A.B) is a 
subset of I: the proposition which is the conditioning basis relative to A and B 
in context n, [A] (respectively [B]) is a subset of I: the proposition expressed 
by A [respectively B], the set of possible worlds j such VJ(A)=1. (If one 
doesn’t want context-indices attached to “if, then” in the object-language, then 
“if,then” has to be treated like an indexical expression: the indices in C serving 
as semantic parameters in addition to the elements of I.)
Before moving on to the subject of probability and conditionals, consider 
how easy it is, in the bases-theory of conditionals, to solve the conundrum 
that “if Verdi and Bizet were countrymen, then Bizet would have been Italian” 
and “if Verdi and Bizet were countrymen, then Verdi would have been French” 
each appears to be true separately, although they cannot very well be true 
together. The first counterfactual is true on the basis of “Verdi is Italian”: the 
second counterfactual is true on the basis of “Bizet is French”; both of 
them are indeed true on the basis of “Verdi is Italian, and Bizet is French” (and
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any basis that is stronger); but this is a basis that contradicts the antecedent of 
the counterfactual (assuming that being Italian implies not being the country­
man of any French). While bases that are inconsistent with the antecedent of 
a conditional are not forbidden by the definitions, they are certainly not 
normal. (One might consider adding to the first disjunct of the definiens of 
DI “&P(bn&A)”; then there is no basis on which both counterfactuals are 
true.)
12.
On the present account of conditionals, what about the (subjective) probability 
of a conditional and its relation to the conditional probability of its succedent 
given its antecedent? These two probabilities, as Lewis has argued (in [1976]), 
cannot always be guaranteed to be the same by the truth-conditions of 
conditionals—on pain of triviality. Assuming the axiom-schemata of standard 
probability-theory having been added to the axiom-schemata in section 2 
(L being modified accordingly), I add one more axiom-schema,
A7 N(A^B)-^p(A)=p(B).
which connects modality and probability, and which is justifiable by 
considerations of rationality (remember that “N” is supposed to express 
analytic necessity). An immediate corollary o f A7 is “NA->p(A)=l”, since 
“NAt->N(A<-Xp—>p))” is provable.We then obtain easily (“N A ^N N A ” is a 
theorem-schema of S5)
T12 p(NA)=l v p(NA)=0.
Given this, the fundamental theorem about the probability o f conditionals is
T13 (if A, n-then B)=0 v p(if A, n-thenB)=l v p (ifA , n-then B)=p(bn).
Proof. Assume p(if A, n-then B) is neither 0 nor 1. If p(N(A->B)) were 1, 
p(if A, n-then B) would also be 1 (by DI and probability-theory); hence—  
given the assumption—p(N(A-»B)) is not 1, hence (by T12) p(N(A->B)) is 0. 
Hence by DI and probability theory
(*) P(*f A, n-then B)=p(bn&N(bn&A—>B)), hence—given the assumption— 
p(bn&N(bn&A—>B)) is not 0, hence (by probability-theory) p(N(bn&A—>B)) 
is not 0, hence (by T12) p(N(bn&A—>B)) is 1, hence (by probability-theory)
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(**) p(bn&N(bn&A—>B))=p(bn). Consequently by (*) and (**): 
p(if A, n-then B)=p(bn).
“If A, n-then B” is an average conditional iff “N (A ^B )” is not true, but 
“N(bn&A—>B)” is. It can easily be proved:
T14 p(if A, n-then B)=p(bn), provided “if A, n-then B” is an average 
conditional.
T14 implies that an average conditional is believed precisely, if its basis is 
believed. (This is fitting, since an average conditional is true precisely, if its 
basis is true.)
Concerning the relationship of the probability of conditionals to conditional 
probability, we have:
T 15 p(if A, n-then B)= 1 &p(A)>0 —> p(B/A)= 1.
Proof: Assume p(if A, n-then B)=l and p(A)>0. In case N(A—>B), 
p(A—>B)=1 (by the corollary of A7); hence (by probability theory) 
p(B&A)=p((A—>B)&A)=p(A); hence p(B\A)=l (by the standard definition of 
conditional probability, p(A)>0). In case -N (A ^B ), p(N(A-^B))=0 (by the 
corollary of A7); hence p(bn&N(bn&A—>B))=1 (by probability theory, 
because of the assumption and DI); hence p(bn)=l and p(N(bn&A—>B))=l, 
hence N(bn&A—>B) [else we would have p(N(bn&A—>B))=0], hence (by the 
corollary of A7) p(bn&A—>B)=1 and p(bn)=l; hence 
p(B&bn&A)=p((bn&A—>B)&bn&A)=p(bn&A),p(B&bn&A)=p(B&A). 
p(bn&A)=p(A); consequently, p(B&A)=p(A), hence p(B/A)=l.
T16 p(bn)=l —> p(B\A)=l, provided p(A)>0 and “if A. n-then B“ is an
average conditional.
Given T14, T16 is an immediate consequence of T15.
T15 does not distinguish conditionals from material implications, because 
for these we can of course prove the analogous theorem 
“p(A->B)=l&p(A)>0 -»  p(B/A)=l.” But it is well known that p(A->B) may 
be close to 1, while p(B\A)=0: let p(~A) be close to 1, but not equal to 1, while 
p(B)=0. In this respect, however, conditionals act differently from material 
implications (in normal situations of utterance where the speaker does not 
firmly believe that the proposition expressed by the antecedent and the basis 
for the utterance o f the conditional do not both obtain together):
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T17 p(if A, n-then B) close to 1, but not equal to 1, & p(bn&A)>0 -> p(B/A) 
almost equal to 1.
Proof. Assume that p(if A, n-then B) is close to 1, but not equal to 1; hence 
by T13 p(if A, n-then B)=p(bn), hence p(bn) is close to 1, but not equal to 1. 
Hence also p(N(A-»B))=0 (otherwise by T12 p(N(A->B))=l, therefore 
p(if A, n-then B)=l—contradicting the assumption). Hence also 
p(N(bn&A—>B))=1 (otherwise by T12 p(N(bn&A->B))=0, therefore, since 
p(N(A—>B))=0, p(if A, n-then B)=0—contradicting the assumption). Since 
p(N(bn&A->B))=l, p(bn&A—>B)=1 [for suppose p(bn&A->B) is not 1, then 
by the corollary of A7 ~N(bn&A—>B), hence N-N(bn&A—>B), hence by that 
same corollary p(~N(bn&A—>B))=1, hence 
p(N(bn&A-»B))=0—contradicting p(N(bn&A—>B))=1]; hence
(*) p(bn&A&B)=p(bn&A). p(bn&A)=p(A)+p(bn)-p(bnvA); therefore, since 
p(bn) is close to 1, but not equal to 1, p(bn&A) is almost equal to p(A). 
p(bn&A&B)=p(A&B)+p(bn)-p(bnvA&B); therefore, since p(bn) is close to 1, 
while not equal to 1, p(bn&A&B) is almost equal to p(A&B). Consequently in 
virtue of (*): p(A&B) almost equals p(A). Therefore, since p(A)>0 [this is a 
consequence of the further assumption p(bn&A)>0] and since p(A&B)>0 [this 
is a consequence of p(bn&A&B)>0, which because of p(bn&A&B)=p(bn&A) 
is a consequence of p(bn&A)>0], p(B/A) is almost equal to 1.
The above counter-example which demonstrates that the analogue of T17 
for material implications does not hold—p(nonA) close to 1, but not equal to 1, 
p(B)=0— is incompatible with the antecedent of T17: we can deduce [see 
above] from that antecedent p(bn&A&B)=p(bn&A); hence, 
if p(B)=0, p(bn&A)=0—contradicting that antecedent. [Comment: Suppose 
that “N(A-»B<-»bm)” is true for some m (that is, suppose that the material 
implication “A->B” expresses a basis for conditionals). Then we have as an 
instance of T17 “p(if A, m-then B) is close to 1, but not equal to
1, & p(bm&A)>0 -> p(B/A) almost equal to 1 But, on the basis of D 1, this 
amounts to “p((A->B)vN (A->B)) is close to 1, but not equal to
1, & p(A&B)>0 —> p(B/A) almost equal to 1.” Since we can prove “p(A—>B) is 
close to 1, but not equal to 1 <-> p((A->B)vN (A-^B)) is close to 1, but not 
equal to 1”, we finally obtain “p(A->B) is close to 1, but not equal to
1, & p(A&B)>0 —> p(B/A) almost equal to 1.” For material implications 
expressing bases for conditionals, T17 amounts to a theorem of elementary 
probability theory.]
T17 and T15 completely fit the fact that the probability of a fully  
counterfactual conditional that is assertable in a certain context o f utterance
U. Meixner 73
cannot ever be the conditional probability of the succedent given the 
antecedent. For a counterfactual conditional “if A had been, n-then B would 
have been” can only be [correctly] asserted, if the speaker firmly believes that 
its succedent is false—even if the probability of the counterfactual conditional 
for him is, albeit not equal to 1, at least close to 1 [that probability being 
only close to 1 involves, as can be seen from D3 and the proof of T17 above, 
p(if A, n-then B) is almost 1, p(N(A—>B))=0, p(N(bn&A—>B))=1, p(bn) is 
almost 1], But if p(B)=0, then p(B/A) is also zero, if p(B/A) is defined at all, 
while p(if A had been, n-then B would have been) must be 1 or almost 1, given 
that “if A had been, n-then B would have been” is assertable in the context 
of utterance. However, neither T15 nor T17 are applicable in that case: for we 
have as theorems: if p(if A had been, n-then B would have been)=l, then 
p(A)=0; if p(if A had been, n-then B would have been) is almost 1 and p(B)=0, 
then p(bn&A)=0. (T17 and T15 are also inapplicable in case of assertable 
semi-counterfactual conditionals; for a semi-counterfactual is only assertable, if 
the speaker firmly believes that its antecedent “A” is false, that is, if p(A)=0.)
13.
Finally, how can causal statements be treated according to the basis-theory of 
conditionals? Let L be extended to such an extent that it includes singular 
terms and quantifiers for events, and a monadic predicate “H” such that “H(x)” 
means “[event] x happens”, and a dyadic predicate “« ” such that “(x « y )” 
means “[the time of event] x is before [the time of event] y.” (For a theory of 
events and their happening, see my [1994].) Consider then the following 
definitions:
D6 B, n-because A := A&P-B&(if A, n-then B).
D7 y n-because of x := H(y), n-because H(x).
“y n-because of x” is not yet “x n-causes y.” To get there, certain among the 
bases for the utterance of conditionals have to be distinguished as being causal 
bases. This, I submit, is a very difficult philosophical task (maybe without 
satisfactory solution); but it is not a task I need to tackle in this paper. I may 
simply procede .on the assumption that we know what makes a basis a causal 
basis, and that some bases are causal bases. Moreover, x n-causes y does seem 
to require that x happens before y; however, I do not want to enter into a 
debate on this. The following definition, then, captures at least a very' important 
conception of causation:
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Provided that “bn” expresses a causal basis:
D8 x n-causes y := (x«y)& (y n-because o f x).
Note that “N(x)(y)((x«y)-»P(Hx&~Hy))” seems very much to be 
true, and so does “(y)P-H(y).” If they are, “x n-causes y” amounts to 
“(x«y)&H(x)&bn&N(bn&Hx->H(y))”, provided that “bn” expresses a 
causal basis.
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